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DUNN

[46 C.2d 639; 297 P.2d 9641

A.

23936. In Bank. June 6,

Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Values.-Where it
on
cross-examination that a witness'
as to
value
is based on
it may be stricken from
the record.
Eminent Domain-Value of Land Taken-Profits.-Evidenee
of
derived from a business conducted on land sought to
be condemned is too speculative, uncertain and remote to be
considered as a basis for ascertaining market value.
Id.-Value of Land Taken-Rental Value.-Generally, income
from property in the way of rents is a proper element to be
considered in arriving at the measure of compensation to be
paid for the taking of property.
Id.-Proceedings-Evidence.-In an action to condemn land
for highway purposes, the trial court erred in striking testimony of the owners' witness with
to a lease and to a
so-called bonus value of the lease.
Id.- Proceedings- Appeal- Reversible Error.- The trial
court's error in rejecting evidence concerning a lease on a
parcel sought to be condemned was prejudicial where the evidence with respect to whether the lease was made in good
faith was conflicting, and where the jury was precluded by
instructions from considering the lease as a factor in fixing
the value of the property.
Id.-Value of Property Taken-Prospective Uses.-Where land
sought to be condemned is not presently available :f'or a particular use by reason of a zoning ordinance or other restriction imposed by law, but the
tends to show a "reason~
able probability" of a change in the near :future, the effect of
such probability on the minds of' purchasers generally may
be taken into consideration in fixing present market value.
See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 370; Am.Jnr., Evidence, § 890
et seq.
Income. as an element in determining value of' property taken
See also Oal.Jur.2d,
!!innwmt. Domain, § 72 et seq.; Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, § 344.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, §.530(3); [2] Eminent
Domain, § 82; [3]· E.minent Domain, § 81; [4] Eminent Domain,
; [5] Eminent Domain, § 182; [6] Eminent Domain, § 69(7).

in eminent domain, note, 65 A.L.R. 455.
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PEoPu~

v. DuNN

[46 C.2d

of the Superior Court of San
Affirnwd in part and

,f1H1ge.

Action to condemn two parcels of land for highway purposes. ,Judgment for plaintiff affirmed as to one parcel and
to other parcel.
,James A. Moore and George A. \Vefltover for Appellants.
C.
R B. Pegram, Herbert J. Williams,
Albert J. Day and Joseph A. Montoya for Respondent.
GIBSON, C. J.-Defendant owners have appealed from
a judgment condemning two parcels of land for highway
purposes. Parcel 1 consisted of several lots at the end of
an unimproved block owned by defendants, and Parcel 2
consisted of two lots separated from Parcel 1 by an intervening street. The owners commenced construction of a
garage on Parcel 2 about August 1, 1953, and assertedly
spent some $12,000 on the building prior to commencement
of this action. On August 19 the Highway Commission
adopted a resolution determining that public interest and
necessity required the condemnation of the two parcels, and
on August 25 this action was brought.
'l'he People and the owners each produced two expert
witnesses who gave conflicting opinions as to damages. With
reference to Parcel 1, the estimates of value ran from $8,340
to $32,000, tlH• severance damage from nil to $4,000, and
the benefit to the remainder of the property from nil to
$5,000. As to Parcel 2, the values ranged from $15,000 to
$46,550. The jury, which viewed the premises, found that
the value of Parcel 1 was $11,000, the severance damage
was $500, and the special benefit to the remainder was $2,000,
and that the value of Parcel 2 was $15,000. Judgment was
thereafter entered awarding $11,000 for Parcel 1 and $15,000
for Parcel 2.
The principal question is whether the court erred in rejecting evidence concerning a lease on Parcel 2. The lease,
dated July 31, 1953, was for a term of 25 years, and it provided that the owners should construct a building for garage
purposes and that the lessees should pay any increase in
real property taxes after the first levy against the improvements. The lease 1vaR first mentioned during the direct exami-
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for the "bonus value" of the lease.
a motion to strike the valuation tes.tm1on.v
and instructed
witness Hartestified among other
in substance that
value of Parcel Number 2, he took into conof $15,000 on a
on
a so-called bonus
~"'''"""wh.
Yon will
all of the
of
as to that lease to the same extent
when
never heard it."
ue~>v.HJ•u asked on the direct examination of
the court ruled that, by analogy to cases
of the
that evidence of the net profit from property is not
the lease would not be received in evidence.
·where it appears on cross-examination that the witas to market value is based upon improper
it may be stricken from the record. ( Oity
v.
96 Cal.App. 708, 716, 722 [248
of neu,wvnu
15 Cal.App.2d 184,
[59 P.2d
19 Cal.2d 713,
744
P.2d
.)
It is settled that evidence of profits
from a
conducted on the land is too speculative, uncertain
remote to be considered as a basis for ascertaining
value. (Stoekton & OopperopoUs R. Oo. v. Galgiani,
139
; de Freitas v. Town of Suisun Oity,
265-266 [149 P.
[agricultural land};
v. Deaeon, 119 Cal.App. 491, 494 [7
fi"''"''""l ; 7 A.L.R. 163, 164; 16 A.L.R.2d
On the other hand, it is the general rule that
from
in the way of rents is a proper element
at the measure of compensation
for the
of property. (See 1 Orgel on
under Eminent Domain (2d ed., 1953), pp. 703708-712; 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed., 1952),
215-219; J ahr, Law of Eminent Domain (1953),
"'"'" .. "'"""; 18 Am.Jur. §
p. 988; 65 A.L.R. 455; 16
;.u•.ll;.:::;u 1113.) [ 4] The court erred in striking the evidence
~£r<uH.eu
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[46 0.2d

the j nry to
all his
to the lease.
[5]
that the error was not prejudicial because
the essential terms of the lease were before the jury and
because there was evidence that the lease was entered into
for the purpose of increasing the amount of the award. The
evidence with respect to whether the lease was made in good
faith was conflicting, and the jury was not instructed on
the
Although plaintiff's witnesses gave some testimony concerning the terms of the lease, the jury was precluded by the instructions from considering the lease as a
factor in fixing the value of the property. We are satisfied
that, in view of the entire record, the error was prejudicial.
As to Parcel 1 it is contended that, in fixing the amount
of severance damages, it was error to admit evidence of the
probability of a change of zoning of the remainder of the
block from which Parcel 1 was taken. [6] Where the land
is not presently available for a particular use by reason of
a zoning ordinance or other restriction imposed by law, but
the evidence tends to show a ''reasonable probability'' of a
change in the near future, the effect of such probability upon
the minds of purchasers generally may be taken into consideration in fixing present market value. (Long Beach City
H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Oal.2d 763, 768-769 [185 P.2d 585,
173 A.L.R. 249], quoting with approval from 1 Nichols on
Eminent Domain (2d ed.) § 219, p. 669.) Here the People's
experts testified that they had made investigations and that
as a result they were of the opinion that a change of zoning
was reasonably or highly probable. There was no error in
the admission of such testimony.
The judgment is affirmed as to Parcel 1 and reversed
as to Parcel 2.
Traynor, J., Spence, J., and MeOomb, ,J., coneurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in
the judgment of reversal as to Parcel 2, but dissent from
the judgment of affirmance as to Parcel 1. In my opinion
nothing could be more speculative than prospective action
of a zoning authority. It is as changeable as the political
fortunes of its members. The admission of such evidence was
prejudicially erroneous.
I am still in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Schauer in his dissenting opinion in Long Beach City
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[ 46 C.2d 539; 297 P.2d 964 I

Dist. v.

30 Cal.2d 763, 775
249], that evidence of the adaptability and
for all useful purposes, regardless of the purpose
it is presently zoned, is admissible in an eminent
proceeding.
therefore reverse the whole

coneurred.
Concurring and
concur in the
affirmance of the judgment as to Parcel 1 but I dissent from
the reversal of the judgment as to Parcel 2.
that
it
error to instruct the jury to disregard the
of witness Harrington's testimony concerning the importance
of
lease in determining market value, the error did not
result in a miscarriage of justice. The terms of the lease were
described by other witnesses and therefore they were
before the jury.
Furthermore, the record indicates that the lease was made
for the purpose of extracting an award in excess of the
true market value of the parcel, and that it in fact had no
proper bearing on true market value. It is conceded that
the lease was executed only 26 days before the condemnation
proceeding was brought and only 20 days before the Highway Commission adopted a resolution determining that public
interest and necessity required the condemnation of the parcels. ·witnesses for both sides agreed that at the time the
lease was entered into it was common knowledge that the
state was planning to make improvements on the parcels
and that their acquisition was necessary to the project. 'rhe
record also discloses substantial evidence that four or five
months before the lease was entered into the state gave
written notice to both the planning commission and the city
eonncil of the city in which Parcel 2 was situated that it
intended to ae(]nire the land; that the state's intention to
Parcel 2 was a matter of common knowledge well
before the lease was entered into and the construction of the
garage was begun; that at the request of the defendant the
zone location of Parcel 2 was changed from residential to
commercial after the state's intention to acquire the parcel
had become commonly known; that the construction on thn
continued to the vct·y clay when the condemnation
action was filed despite the fact that it was known brfore
that time that the :-;tate iutendrt1 to arc1nire the parcel; that
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the

that the lessees' business would succeed were
poor credit
and that
rent was out of
to the value
aml to the amount of bnsiness the lessees could
to carry on. Under the
the exclusion of

uneonseionable tactics.

F. No. 19026.

In Bank.

June 6,

.J. Ll'~DBEJW, Respondc>nt, v. C01T~TY OF
ALAMEDA et al., Defendants and Appellants; 'l'HE
ROl\IAN CATHOLIC \\'I1JhF'AHE COHPORATION OF
Corporation), Intervener and
SAN PRANCISCO
Appellant.

~\LPHED

[8]
[1] Taxation-Remedies of Taxpa.yer.-Actions by a taxpayer to

challenge the legality of a tax exemption are authorized by
Code Civ. Proc., § 526a, and, being in aid of the collection of
taxes, are distinguishable from cases in which a party seeking
to avoid taxation is denied mandamus on the ground that an
action for refund of illegally collected taxes constitutes
an adequate remedy.
[2] !d.-Subjects of Taxation.-All property must be taxed unless
an exemption is authorized by the state Constitution or granted
by the laws of the United States.
[3] Charities-Definition.-The word "charity" may be defined as
a gift to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the
benefit of an indefinite number of persons-either by bringing
their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by
assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or
maintaining buildings or works or otherwise lessening the
burdens of government.
See Cal.Jur., Taxation, §56.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, ~ 265;
Taxation, § 39;
[3] Charities, § 1; [ 4] Charities, § 18;
'raxation, § 69; [6, 9,
12,
Taxation, § 78;
8] Taxation, ~ 68; DOJ Constitutional
Law, 59; [11] Constitutional Law, § 35.
*Reportm· 's Note: Respondent Lundborg died after filing of this
decision and Paul W. Hersey as Special Administrator was substituted
in his place.
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